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Laura Wagner
1. The Question
The question that this paper addresses is, Why can you have a per-
fect of a progressive (1) but not a progressive of a perfect (2)? The
account that this paper will give in answer to this question will be
primarily semantic: I will argue that it is the aspectual constraints
imposed by the perfect and progressive operators that dictate their
scope interaction.
(1) The president has been visiting Philadelphia.
(2) * The president is having visited Philadelphia.
2. Aspectual Shifting and Presupposition
Accommodation
It is well known that the aspectual type (i.e., situation aspect in the
terminology of Smith 1991) of a sentence must be calculated from
various elements. The verb and its arguments (including the quan-
tificational properties of those arguments), particles, and adjuncts all
contribute to the aspectual type. For example an atelic sentence (3a)
may become telic as a result of arguments (3b) or adjuncts (3c); or
the telicity may be emphasized by means of a particle (4). Further,
a telic sentence (5a) may become atelic given, for example, different
quantificational force on its object (5b).
(3) a. The chicken ran.
b. The chicken ran a mile.
c. The chicken ran across the road.
(4) The girl ate up a sandwich.
(5) a. The child drank a glass of milk.
b. The child drank milk.
My thanks go to Sabine Iatridou, Mark Steedman, Beverly Spejewski,
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These examples manipulate parts of the thematic structure
of the sentence and their aspectual influences seem to stem frommore
general aspectual properties of argument structure and lexical seman-
tics. Precisely how these aspectual influences get integrated into a
theory of argument structure is a matter of some debate (Olsen, 1994;
Van Hout 1996 among others). This debate is somewhat outside the
scope of this paper and I will dwell on it no further.
A somewhat different case of aspectual shifting is seen with
adverbials. Certain adverbials are used as tests to determine aspectual
type. Thus, in Dowty (1979) we find that in X time adverbials are
felicitous only with telic sentences (6) and for X time adverbials are
felicitous only with atelic sentences (7).
(6) a. Maggie built a house in an hour.
b. * Maggie built a house for an hour.
(7) a. * Maggie ran around in an hour.
b. Maggie ran around for an hour.
The tests are used frequently (Vendler, 1967; Dowty 1979;
Smith 1991, e.g.) and they seem to get at a valid intuition. However,
as is periodically noted, these tests are very flexible—it’s not really
the case that 6b and 7a are ungrammatical or even uninterpretable,
it’s that they don’t mean the same things as 6a and 7b. Moreover, the
difference in meaning is highly systematic: 6b has an atelic interpre-
tation and 7a has a telic one.
Following Moens 1987 and Moens and Steedman 1988, I
propose that the right way to think about these adverbials is not as
inert elements that select sentences of a particular aspectual type, but
as active elements that can force aspectual coercion. We might even
say, following the terminology of pragmatics (e.g. Heim 1988) that
adverbials presuppose they will be applied to sentences of a particular
aspectual type and that when they are not, the sentences shift to ac-
commodate the presupposition. Presupposition accommodation feels
like coercion and is highly context dependent. Thus, if we support
a sentence with a plausible context, the accommodated interpretation
also seems plausible. For example, the for X time adverbial presup-
poses that it applies to an atelic predicate; it is bad with (8a) but not
with the context supplied in (8b).
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(8) a. ?? Maggie died for an hour.
b. Maggie died for an hour each night on stage.
Moreover, we can get accommodation of different sorts. For
example, the in X time adverbial presupposes that it applies to a telic
predicate. When it is given an atelic predicate, accommodation can
happen in a variety of ways. In (9a), the atelic sentence is given an
implicit endpoint (supplied by the context); in (9b), the adverbial is
made to apply to the preparatory time period that is bounded by the
event itself. The precise means of accommodation is determined by
context.
(9) a. Unwilling to start right after the priest left, Maggie tor-
tured the prisoner in a few minutes.
b. Showing her skill with the thumbscrews, Maggie tor-
tured the prisoner in a few minutes.
2.1. The Progressive’s Presupposition
Moens 1987 argues that the progressive operator requires an activity
(+durative, –telic event) as its input. In my terms, that means that the
progressive presupposes it applies to an activity. Notationally, I will
indicate this input presupposition as in (10).
(10) PROG (activity)
Of course, progressives operate over events of all types but
when they are applied to non-activities, those events must accom-
modate to meet the presupposition. We can view the well known
semantic effects of the progressive, then, as various forms of presup-
position accommodation. These arguments are laid out in detail in
Moens 1987, but I will go over a few examples briefly here.
(11) Maggie was tapping on the table.
(12) Maggie was building a house... but she didn’t finish it.
(13) Maggie was winning the race... until the last lap.
In (11–13) are examples of, respectively, a punctual (–dura-
tive, –telic), an accomplishment (+durative, +telic) and an achieve-
ment (–durative, +telic) in the progressive. Each of these differs in
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features from the activity type and each undergoes an accommoda-
tion process. The punctual (11), which needs to accommodate along
the durativity dimension, gives an iterative interpretation; the accom-
plishment (12), which needs to accommodate along the telicity di-
mension, loses its entailment of completion (the so-called imperfec-
tive paradox); the achievement (13) which needs to accommodate
along both dimensions, is interpreted as meaning the preparatory pro-
cess to the event. Thus the varied semantic effects of the progressive
are traced to a common source—accommodation to meet the input
requirement of being an activity.
2.2. The Perfect’s Presupposition
The perfect operator also places a constraint on its input, though a
much looser one: the perfect presupposes that it applies to a stage
level predicate (SLP), as noted in (14) below.
(14) PERF (slp)
SLPs include all non-stative aspectual types as well as many
stative ones. They are, roughly speaking, transitory properties in con-
trast to individual level predicates (ILP) which ascribe more or less
permanent properties. The idea that the perfect presupposes an SLP
is compatible with the analysis of the perfect in Smith 1991 and fits in
more generally with the claim in Iatridou 1996 that the complement
of the possessive have is an SLP.
Because so many aspectual types are already SLPs, there are
few times when accommodation will be necessary. The only excep-
tion to this, of course, is ILPs; we can see in (15) and (16) that the
perfect of an ILP sounds odd in isolation, but with a plausible context
supplied, we can re-interpret the predicates as SLPs.
(15) a. ?? Maggie has been tall.
b. Maggie has been tall for many months now.
(16) a. ?? Bill Clinton has been president.
b. Jimmy Carter has been president.
c. Bill Clinton has been president for 4 years now.
The accommodation process of an ILP into a SLP seems
to most often involve bounding the ILP, either by introducing a be-
ginning point or an endpoint. Having either a beginning or ending
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transition point in the predicate seems to be sufficient accommoda-
tion. Thus, in (15b) the ILP accommodates by introducing a begin-
ning point and in (16b and c) an endpoint is introduced. Since this is
a context driven process, note that we can use real world knowledge
about transition points to accommodate the predicate, as in (16b):
knowing the fact that Carter is no longer president provides sufficient
context to view be president as an SLP.
3. Aspectual Assertions of the Perfect and
Progressive
The flip side of a presupposition is an assertion and in this section, I
will examine the aspectual assertions of the perfect and progressive.
These operators are located outside the VP (in IP, or TP, or AGRP,
or...) and they have sentence level scope. Not surprisingly, then,
the aspectual assertions (or output conditions) they make are true of
the sentences that contain them. This requires us to recognize the
aspectual class of whole sentences.
3.1. The Progressive’s Assertion
Progressive sentences are states, as noted in (17).
(17)
Vlach 1981 offers several conceptual reasons to believe this,
including the fact that constructions with the main verb be typically
are stative as well as the fact that the progressive is historically re-
lated to a stative locative construction. Dowty 1979 and Smith 1991
offer a slightly more concrete test: progressive sentences have the
subinterval property characteristic of states.
Perhaps the strongest objection to this claim is that progres-
sive sentences have a ‘dynamic’ character that sets them apart from
an average state. I have two responses to this objection. First, this
may simply mean that progressive states are just a subset of states,
namely the SLP subset. Second, it may be that the aspectual quality
is not the entire semantic effect of the progressive, but the fact that
progressive sentences are states plus some additional property does
not undermine the basic fact that they are indeed states. Moens 1987
265
U. Penn Working Papers in Linguistics Volume 4.2 (1997)
gets around this problem by defining the category ‘dynamic state’
which is intended to capture the particularity of progressive states.
For this paper, all that is necessary is that the progressive output a
state that is an SLP.
3.2. The Perfect’s Assertion
The perfect construction was apparently used historically to ascribe
properties; that is, the subject has (or possesses) the property in the
predicate. Intuitively, this is still part of the perfect’s meaning (and
is, I think, the intuition behind Smith 1991’s participant property of
the perfect). Moreover, the perfect (synchronically, at least) ascribes
a particular kind of property—namely, an individual level one. My
notation for this is shown in (18) below.
(18)
Sentences in the perfect indeed pass many of the standard
tests for ILPs (cf. Kratzer 1995 for relevant tests). For example, ILPs
are bad as modifiers in existential sentences and so are perfects:
(19) a. There is a girl in the yard/??intelligent.
b. ?? There is a girl having been in the yard.
ILPs are bad in perception sentences, and so are perfects:
(20) a. I saw Maggie asleep/??a linguist.
b. ?? I saw Maggie having been to Boston.
In absolutive constructions, ILPs yield a causative (and not
temporal) reading and so do perfects:
(21) a. Being tall, Maggie can reach the ceiling.
= because she is tall
b. Standing on a chair, Maggie can reach the ceiling.
= when she stands on a chair
c. Having been to Boston, Maggie thinks it is swell.
=because she has been to Boston
Perfect sentences do fail some of the ILP tests, however.
ILPs yield generic interpretations on bare plural subjects, but perfect
sentences do not:
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(22) a. Bears hibernate in winter (generic on bears).
b. Bears have eaten my petunias (not generic on bears).
In fact, the ability to cause genericity on a bare plural sub-
ject with a perfect seems to depend primarily on properties of the
predicate before the perfect applies. Thus (23) does have a generic
interpretation:
(23) Bears have hibernated in Yosemite park since the stone age.
I have argued above that the adverbial since the stone age
coerces the ILP hibernate into a SLP and is necessary in order to
accommodate the presupposition of the perfect. However, the bare
plural seems able to look within the accommodation and find the ILP
originally present, and thus permits the generic reading. This fact
suggests one of two things is going on. It is possible that coercion
or accommodation is at least a partially transparent process. Or, it
is possible that genericity is determined before the perfect operator
applies. Since we know that aspectual class must be determined from
the entire sentence, including the subject, the perfect (and progres-
sive) presuppositions would have to take all parts of the sentence into
consideration. If genericity is determined by the presence of a generic
operator, I would argue that this operator has lower scope than the
perfect operator.
Another test for ILPs that perfect sentences do not pass is
even more problematic. ILPs are bad in the when-clauses with defi-
nite NPs but perfects are just fine:
(24) a. When Mary knows French, she knows it well.
b. When Mary has been to Boston, she has been to it in
style.
I don’t have a way to account for this fact, but it is interesting
to note that perfect sentences in this context yield only the episodic
reading; that is, in (24b), Mary is no longer in Boston—the sentence
refers to previous episodes of her going to Boston. There is a certain
intuitive sense to getting this reading. After all, the episodic reading
of the perfect is the one most likely to have an event variable to con-
tribute. However, I have no way to integrate this fact into the current
story I am telling. I will therefore put this question aside for now.
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An additional objection to the ILP analysis of perfect sen-
tences is inspired by the following kinds of examples:
(25) I have walked the dog (today).
(26) I have lost my keys... but now I’ve found them.
In both these cases, it seems odd to say the sentence ascribes
an ILP since the property disappears so quickly. In (25), the property
of having been walked lasts only until the next morning when the dog
must be walked again. Similarly in (26), the property of having been
lost is over once the keys are found. I do not think this is a particu-
lar problem for the current analysis for two reasons. First, it can be
avoided formally by giving the perfect operator scope over tempo-
ral adverbs (as in Klein 1994), present and implied. Thus the ILP in
(25) is has been walked today; if we replace today by a non-deictic
expression, the fact that this predicate is an ILP can be seen more
clearly: has been walked on April 1st, 1992 is not a property that
goes away as the day wears on. A similar trick can be pulled with
(26). These examples, I think, raise a larger question about the nature
of ILPs in general. If ILPs are supposed to be permanent properties,
then why do some of them end? This problem has been noted before
(by Kratzer, I think): for example, being a butcher is an ILP and be-
ing angry is an SLP even though some people may be angry for much
more of their life than they are a butcher. The fact that perfect sen-
tences are subject to this same problem only means that they inherit
the theoretical difficulties of being an ILP as well as the explanatory
advantages.
4. A Partial Answer
From the input and output conditions of the perfect and progressive,
we can answer the question this paper originally posed: why can you
have a perfect of a progressive but not a progressive of a perfect? In
short, the output of the progressive is compatible with the input of
the perfect but the reverse is not true. The assertion, or output, of
the progressive is a (dynamic) state and this is compatible with the
presupposition of the perfect (it requires an SLP as input) so all is
well (27). By contrast, the output assertion of a perfect is an ILP
which is not compatible with the progressive’s presupposition of ap-
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plying to an activity (28). Thus, the perfect must have scope over the
progressive to insure that the input-output conditions are met.
(27)
dynamic states are a subset of SLP
(28) *
ILPs are not a subset of activity
But what about presupposition accommodation? In sec-
tion 2, I discussed how adverbials and operators like the perfect and
progressive could coerce their input to meet their presuppositions.
Why is this not possible here? One possible argument is that in fact
such accommodation is possible in principle, but that the context that
would require it is so unusual that we never (or hardly ever) encounter
it. So, for example, this account would predict that (29) would be ac-
ceptable.
(29) Right now Maggie is doing an acting exercise. She is pre-
tending to live through all the stages of life of Susan B. An-
thony. Right now, she is having been in jail for 3 days
after a protest.
I find this judgment hard to get, though it is unclear whether
the source of the difficulty is the strangeness of the context of the
strangeness of the form. In the following section, I will propose that
the output of the perfect and progressive can not undergo accommo-
dation and will suggest a possible syntactic-semantic explanation.
5. Limits on Aspectual Shifting
Let us suppose, then, that the aspectual output assertions of the per-
fect and progressive do not shift to accommodate other presupposi-
tions. Why not? Intuitively, you shouldn’t be able to mark something
explicitly and then override it leaving no trace behind. The perfect
and progressive operators are large pieces of morpho-syntax and their
aspectual effects shouldn’t be completely eliminable.
In support of this point, I note that perfects of progressives
have a characteristic reading which seems to reflect the consistent
contribution of the progressive (cf. also Moens 1987).
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(30) Maggie has been visiting Boston/knockingon the door/eating
a cake.
In the examples in (30), the visiting Boston, knocking on
the door, and eating a cake are happening right up to the moment
of speech for what Comrie calls the ‘perfect of persistent situation’.
A progressive under the perfect seems to encourage, if not outright
require this interpretation. The progressive does not need to shift its
output (a state) to match the presupposition of the perfect (an SLP)
since progressive states are a subset of SLPs, and it maintains its se-
mantic relevance by imposing this characteristic reading on the per-
fect above it.
Looking at the reverse item the output assertion of the per-
fect (an ILP) does not meet the presupposition of the progressive (an
activity) but shifting the ILP to an activity would completely elimi-
nate the perfect’s aspectual contribution. However, this predicts (in-
correctly, I think) that a progressive of a perfect of an ILP will be
better, because the ILP will shift to accommodate to the perfect and
this shift will leave a residual trace of the perfect even after the pro-
gressive eliminates the perfect’s assertion.
(31) Maggie is having been tall for several years now.
Again, I don’t find (31) to be acceptable. If neither context
(29) nor recoverability (31) is the limiting factor, perhaps it is the
syntax of the perfect and progressive that is responsible. Diesing
1992 provides a syntactic framework that may make sense of this
limit on aspectual shifting.
In Diesing’s model, ILPs are distinguished from SLPs syn-
tactically. ILPs create a control structure, in which the subject is base
generated in the IP and controls a PRO subject in the VP. The SLP
reading requires the subject of the sentence to be lowered into the VP
at LF. This lowering operation is available to VP-internal subjects
(which lower from Spec-IP to their base generated position) but not
to ILP subjects (which already have a PRO in Spec-VP). Since the
perfect outputs an ILP, it seems reasonable to suppose that the per-
fect have projects the control IP associated with an ILP. Once such a
structure is in place, however, there is no way for any subject to get
back into the VP since the Spec-VP will have a PRO in it. The prob-
lem then of putting a progressive over the perfect becomes twofold,
270
Aspectual Shifting Wagner
as both the input to the progressive (an activity) and the output of the
progressive (a state) are SLPs. Thus, the progressive doubly requires
the subject to be lowered into the VP but of course such a lowering
operation is blocked by the presence of the intervening perfect con-
trol structure.
In other words, once we have a supported control IP in place
(supported because it is headed by the perfect have) we can’t get rid
of it. Such an IP, however, has semantic consequences which must be
dealt with. The progressive operator has requirements in opposition
to these consequences and so can not take scope over the perfect.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that both the perfect and the progressive
have aspectual presuppositions on their input and aspectual output
assertions. The progressive presupposes that it applies to an activity
and it outputs a state. The perfect presupposes that it applies to an
SLP and it outputs an ILP. I have argued further that although aspec-
tual type often shifts to accommodate the presupposition of an adverb
or operator, the output of the perfect and progressive operators do not
participate in this accommodation process. Thus, the reason that we
can have a perfect of a progressive is because the aspectual input con-
ditions of the perfect (SLP) are compatible with the output conditions
of the progressive (state); the reason that we can not have a progres-
sive of a perfect is because the input conditions of the progressive
(activity) are not compatible with the output conditions of the perfect
(ILP).
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